

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15
ICA-11 ACDA-12 TRSE-00 /101 W
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R 101233Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0213
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USNATO
DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 07233

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: JA, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS: RECENT SOVIET COMMENTS
ON PFT

REF: (A) 77 MOSCOW 17519, (B) MOSCOW 3846

SUMMARY: SOVIET PRESS CONTINUES TO RAIL AGAINST ANTI-SOVIET ASPECTS OF PFT. DESPITE THIS, SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE TAKING A Milder LINE IN PRIVATE, INCLUDING ON POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTION TO A JAPANESE DECISION TO SIGN. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT, WHILE INITIAL SOVIET
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REACTION WOULD BE SHARP, IN LONGER RUN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS WILL MOTIVATE MOSCOW TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH TOKYO. END SUMMARY.

1. SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARY ON PFT: SOVIET PRESS IS DENOUNCING FUKUDA FOR "BOWING" TO CHINESE PRESSURE IN ANNOUNCING RESUMPTION OF PFT NEGOTIATIONS. LONG-SIGNED

ARTICLE FROM TASS PRAVDA CORRESPONDENT IN TOKYO PRINTED IN APRIL 6 PRAVDA CITES AT LENGTH OPPOSITION TO PFT RECENTLY VOICED BY LDP POLITICIANS AND WARNS JAPAN AGAINST SLIDING FURTHER "TOWARD COMPLICITY IN THE ANTI-SOVIET INTRIGUES OF THE MAOISTS."

2. PRIVATE SOVIET COMMENT: IN RECENT DISCUSSION ON PFT WITH EMBOFF, CHIEF OF THE ASIAN SECTION, USA INSTITUTE, VLADIMIR LUKIN, TOOK Milder AND RESIGNED LINE EXPRESSED BY SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL KAPITSA (REF B). LUKIN SAID THAT IN DEBATES WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, HE ARGUES THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD OPPOSE CHINESE POLICY "ONLY WHEN IT HURTS US" AND SHOULD NOT OVERREACT TO EVERY MOVE PEKING MAKES. (COMMENT: LUKIN APPEARED TO BE LAMENTING MOSCOW'S PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF PEKING'S - BUT NOT TOKYO'S - DEFINITION OF PFT'S ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE AS ANTI-SOVIET. THIS HAS LEFT MOSCOW OUT ON A LIMB AS TOKYO MOVES EVER CLOSER TO CONCLUDING PFT. END COMMENT.) LUKIN CLAIMED THAT HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHAT "OUR LEADERS WILL DO" WHEN JAPAN SIGNS THE PFT. HOWEVER, HE THEN STATED THAT THE JAPANESE WILL HAVE TO GET USED TO "TEMPORARY" FISHING AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND JOKED THAT TOKYO WILL ALSO HAVE TO START IMPORTING MORE AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN BEEF TO MAKE UP FOR FISHING LOSSES. LUKIN REITERATED THE UNYIELDING SOVIET POSITION ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, CONFIDENTIAL

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CLAIMING THAT, WITH TIME, THIS PROBLEM WILL BECOME LESS OF AN ISSUE IN SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

3. IN APRIL 3 CONVERSATION, SOVIET MFA DEPUTY HEAD OF FIRST FAR EAST DEPT., F. I. POTAPENKO, SEEMED RELATIVELY RELAXED ABOUT PFT, COMMENTING THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF TOKYO'S SIGNING SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED. HE WAS EQUIVOCAL IN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTION TO PFT SIGNING. AT ONE POINT HE SAID THAT MOSCOW'S REACTION WOULD DEPEND ON THE EXACT TERMS OF THE HEGEMONY CLAUSE. HE LATER SUGGESTED THAT ANY MENTION OF HEGEMONY IN THE TREATY, NO MATTER HOW IT WAS PHRASED AND HOW THE JAPANESE SAID THEY INTERPRETED IT, WOULD BE BADLY REGARDED BY THE SOVIETS, GIVEN THE STATED CHINESE DESIRE TO CREATE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL FRONT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

4. PROXIMITY OF SOVIET NAVAL POWER: IN RECENT DISCUSSION OF PFT DEVELOPMENTS WITH EMBASSY NAVAL ATTACHE, JAPANESE NAVAL ATTACHE HERE MENTIONED THAT, ON MARCH 8 AND FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS, THE SOVIETS SENT MILITARY VESSELS (TWO GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATES) THROUGH

THE STRAITS OF TSUGARU BETWEEN HONSHU AND HOKKAIDO.
HE INTERPRETED THIS AS A SOVIET MOVE TO "REMIND" THE
JAPANESE OF THE NEARBY AND FORMIDABLE SOVIET MILITARY
PRESENCE. SOVIETS MAY ALSO HAVE HOPED THAT BREZHNEV'S
VISIT TO THE SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET AND HIS APRIL 17
SPEECH WOULD LEAVE A SIMILAR IMPRESSION WITH THE
JAPANESE, EVEN THOUGH THE MAIN AUDIENCES WERE VERY
CLEARLY THE UNITED STATES (FOR THE SPEECH) AND CHINA
(FOR THE VISIT TO THE FLEET AS WELL AS HIS PREVIOUS
VISITS TO A MISSILE GROUP IN NOVOSIBIRSK AND TRAINING
MANEUVERS AT Khabarovsk).
5. COMMENT: ALL EVIDENCE HERE SUGGESTS THAT THE
SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET DETERMINED EXACTLY HOW THEY WILL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 07233

REACT TO A JAPANESE DECISION TO SIGN PFT. THE SOVIET
PRESS TREATMENT AND THE SOVIET NAVAL "GESTURES" INDICATE
A HARD LINE; PRIVATE STATEMENTS WE HEAR FROM SOVIET
MFA OFFICIALS AND SOVIET ACADEMICS SPECIALIZING ON
JAPAN INDICATE A Milder REACTION. WE BELIEVE THAT
UNKNOWN FACTORS, SUCH AS THE FINAL WORDING OF THE
HEGEMONY CLAUSE AND JAPANESE ANNOUNCEMENTS AT THE TIME

OF THE SIGNING COULD ALSO HAVE A BEARING ON THE SOVIET
REACTION, WHICH, IN ANY CASE, WE EXPECT TO FOLLOW THE
PATTERN DESCRIBED REF A: AN INITIAL SHARP OUTBURST
FOLLOWED BY A LONGER TERM EFFORT TO REINVIGORATE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH TOKYO. MOSCOW, LIKE
TOKYO, HAS BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS FOR
NOT ALLOWING SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS TO SINK TOO LOW.
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